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SODEXO: A System Framework for Deployment and Exploitation of
Deceptive Honeybots in Social Networks
Quanyan Zhu, Andrew Clark, Radha Poovendran and Tamer Bas¸ar
Abstract— As social networking sites such as Facebook and
Twitter are becoming increasingly popular, a growing number
of malicious attacks, such as phishing and malware, are
exploiting them. Among these attacks, social botnets have
sophisticated infrastructure that leverages compromised users
accounts, known as bots, to automate the creation of new social
networking accounts for spamming and malware propagation.
Traditional defense mechanisms are often passive and reactive
to non-zero-day attacks. In this paper, we adopt a proactive
approach for enhancing security in social networks by in-
filtrating botnets with honeybots. We propose an integrated
system named SODEXO which can be interfaced with social
networking sites for creating deceptive honeybots and leverag-
ing them for gaining information from botnets. We establish a
Stackelberg game framework to capture strategic interactions
between honeybots and botnets, and use quantitative methods to
understand the tradeoffs of honeybots for their deployment and
exploitation in social networks. We design a protection and alert
system that integrates both microscopic and macroscopic mod-
els of honeybots and optimally determines the security strategies
for honeybots. We corroborate the proposed mechanism with
extensive simulations and comparisons with passive defenses.
Keywords: social networks; cyber security; game theory; bot-
net; malware propagation; Stackelberg games
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks such as Facebook and Twitter are
employed daily by hundreds of millions of users to commu-
nicate with acquaintances, follow news events, and exchange
information. The growing popularity of OSNs has led to a
corresponding increase in spam, phishing, and malware on
social networking sites. The fact that a user is likely to click
on a web link that appears in a friend’s Facebook message or
Twitter feed can be leveraged by attackers who compromise
or impersonate that individual.
An important class of malware attacks on social networks
is social botnets [1], [2]. In a social botnet, an infected user’s
device and social networking account are both compromised
by installed malware. The compromised account is then used
to send spam messages to the user’s contacts, containing
links to websites with the malware executable. As a result,
compromising a single well-connected user could lead to
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hundreds or thousands of additional users being targeted
for spam, many of whom will also become members of
the botnet and further propagate the malware. The most
prominent example of a social botnet to date is Koobface,
which at its peak had infected 600,000 hosts [1].
Current methods for mitigating malware, including social
botnets, in social networks are primarily based on URL
blacklisting. In this defense mechanism, links that are sus-
pected to contain spam or malware are added to a centralized
blacklist controlled by the owner of the social network. After
a link has been blacklisted, the social networking site will
no longer communicate with the IP address indicated by the
link, even if a user clicks the link [3].
While blacklisting can slow the propagation of malware,
there remain several drawbacks to this approach. First, auto-
mated methods for blacklisting links often fail to detect spam
and malware; one survey suggests that 73% of malicious
links go undetected and are not added to the blacklist [4].
Second, automated blacklisting creates the risk of valid
accounts and messages being classified as spam, degrading
the user experience. Third, even for links that are correctly
identified as pointing to malware, there is typically a large
delay between when links are detected and blacklisted. One
study estimates this delay as 25 days on average, while at
the same time most clicks on malware links occur within the
first 48 hours of posting [5].
A promising approach to defending against social botnets
is through deception mechanisms. In a deceptive defense, the
defender generates fake social network profiles that appear
similar to real profiles and waits to receive a link to malware.
The defender then follows the link to the malware site,
downloads the malware executable, and runs it in a quaran-
tined, sandbox environment. By posing as an infected node
and interacting with the owner of the botnet, the defender
gathers links that are reported to the blacklist either before
or shortly after they are posted, reducing the detection time
and increasing the success rate. Currently, however, there is
no systematic approach to modeling social botnets and the
effectiveness of deception, as well as designing an effective
strategy for infiltrating the botnet and gathering information.
In this paper, we introduce an analytical framework for
SOcial network DEception and eXploitation through hOn-
eybots (SODEXO). Our framework has two components,
deployment and exploitation. The deployment component
models how decoy accounts are introduced into the online
social network and gain access to the botnet. The exploitation
component characterizes the behavior of the decoys and the
botnet owner after infiltration has occurred, enabling us to
model the effect of the decoy on the botnet operation.
For the deployment component, we first develop a dynam-
ical model describing the population of a social botnet over
time. We derive the steady-state equilibria of our model and
prove the stability of the equilibria. We then formulate the
problem of selecting the optimal number of honeybots in
order to maximize the information gathered from the botnet
as a convex optimization problem. Our results are extended
to include networks with heterogeneous node degree.
We model the exploitation of the botnet by the honey-
bots as a Stackelberg game between the botmaster and the
honeybots. In the game, the botmaster allocates tasks, such
as spam message delivery, among multiple bots based on
their trustworthiness and capabilities. The honeybots face a
trade-off between obtaining more information by following
the commands of the botmaster, and the impact of those
commands on other network users. We derive closed forms
for the optimal strategies of both the botmaster and hon-
eybots using Stackelberg equilibrium as a solution concept.
We then incorporate the utility of the honeybot owner under
the Stackelberg equilibrium in order to select an optimal
deployment strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. The related work
is reviewed in Section II. In Section III, we describe the
architecture of our proposed framework for deceptive de-
fense. In Section IV, we model the exploitation phase of the
botnet, in which the honeybot gathers the maximum possible
information while avoiding detection by the botmaster. In
Section V, we model the deployment and population dy-
namics of the infected nodes and honeybots. Section VI
describes the Protection and Alert System (PAS), which
provides a unifying framework for controlling deployment
and exploitation. Section VII presents our simulation results.
Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Social botnets are becoming a serious threat for network
users and managers, as they possess sophisticated infras-
tructure that leverages compromised users accounts, known
as bots, to automate the creation of new social networking
accounts for spamming and malware propagation [2].In [6], a
honeypot-based approach is used to uncover social spammers
in online social systems. It has been shown that social
honeypots can be used to identify social spammers with low
false positive rates, and that the harvested spam data contain
signals that are strongly correlated with observable profile
features, such as friend information and posting patterns. The
goal of [6], however, is not to infiltrate the botnet, but to
use honeypots to differentiate between real and spam online
profiles.
In [4], a zombie emulator is used to infiltrate the Koobface
botnet to discover the identities of fraudulent and compro-
mised social network accounts. The authors arrived at the
conclusion that “to stem the threat of Koobface and the
rise of social malware, social networks must advance their
defenses beyond blacklists and actively search for Koobface
content, potentially using infiltration as a means of early
Fig. 1. System architecture of honeybot deceptive mechanism in social
networks
detection.” This insight coincides with our proactive ap-
proach for defending social networks using deceptive social
honeybots.
Deception provides an effective approach for building
proactively secure systems [7], [8]. Considerable amount
of work can be found using deception for enhancing cyber
security. In recent literature on intrusion detection systems,
honeypots have been used to monitor suspicious intrusions
[9], [10], and provide signatures of zero-day attacks [11]. In
[12], to enhance the security of control systems in critical
infrastructure, deception has been proposed to make the
system more difficult for attackers to plan and execute
successful attacks. At present, however, there has been no
analysis on the impact of deception on malware propagation
in social networks.
In order to establish a formal method to evaluate the
performance of deceptive social honeybots against botnets,
we employ a game- and system- theoretic approach to model
the strategic behaviors of botnets and the deployment and
exploitations of honeybots. Such approaches have become
pivotal for designing security mechanisms in a quantitative
way [13]. In [14], an optimal control approach to modeling
the maximum impact of a malware attack on a communica-
tion network is presented. In [15], the authors have proposed
an architecture for a collaborative intrusion detection network
and have adopted a game-theoretic approach for designing a
reciprocal incentive compatible resource allocation compo-
nent of the system against free-rider and insider attacks.
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we introduce our honeybot-based defense
system named SODEXO for protecting social networks
against malicious attacks. Fig. 1 illustrates the architecture
of SODEXO. Our framework consists of two components,
namely, honeybot deployment (HD) and honeybot exploita-
tion (HE). HD deals with the distribution of honeybots within
social networks and the deception mechanisms to infiltrate
the botnet to learn and monitor the activities in botnets.
HE aims to use the successfully infiltrated honeybots to
collect as much information as possible from the botnet. The
behaviors of the two blocks are coordinated by a Protection
and Alert System (PAS), which uses the gathered information
to generate real-time signatures and alerts for the social
network (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. Architecture of the protection and alert system
The introduction of honeybots into a social network allows
a proactive defense and monitoring of the social network
against botnets. The SODEXO architecture bears its resem-
blance to feedback control systems. The HE component
behaves as a security sensor of the social network; PAS can
be seen as a controller which takes the “measurements” from
HE and yields a honeypot deployment strategy; and HD acts
as an actuator that updates the honeypot policy designed by
PAS. In the following subsections, we discuss in detail each
component of SODEXO.
A. Honeybot Deployment (HD)
A honeypot is deployed by first creating an account on
a social networking site. The account profile is designed to
imitate a real user, as in [6]. Once deployed, the honeypot
sends a set of friend requests to a set of randomly chosen
other users. The honeypot continues sending friend requests
to random users until the desired number of neighbors,
denoted d, has been reached. The honeypot monitors the
message traffic of its neighbors, which may include personal
messages, wall posts, or Twitter feeds, and follows any
posted link. If the link points to malware and has not been
blacklisted, then the honeypot becomes a member of the
social botnet and proceeds to the exploitation stage.
B. Honeybot Exploitation (HE)
The HE component of SODEXO takes advantage of the
successfully infiltrated honeybots to gain as much infor-
mation as possible from the botnet. The information is
obtained in the form of command and control messages. The
honeybots need to gain an appropriate level of trust from the
bots and respond to the C&C messages while minimizing
harm to the legitimate social network users and avoiding
legal liability. Honeybots work collaboratively to achieve this
goal. In the case where honeybots are commanded to send
spam or malware to network users, they can send them to
each other to remain active in the botnet. Depending on
the sophistication of the botnet, honeybots can sometimes
be detected using mechanisms described in [16], [17]. In
this case, a higher growth rate of honeybot population will
be needed to replace the detected honeybots. Hence, the
performance of HE heavily depends on the effectiveness of
HD, and in turn, HD should change its policy based on
the sophistication of botnets and the amount of information
learned in HE.
C. Protection and Alert System (PAS)
The major role of PAS is to provide security policies
for HD based on the information learned from HE. Fig. 2
Fig. 3. Illustration of the interactions between social networks and botnets
illustrates two major functions of PAS. The first step of PAS
is to process the messages and logs gained from honeybots.
Using data mining and machine learning techniques, it is
possible that the structure of botnets can be inferred from
network traffic information [18] and botnet C&C channels in
a local area network can be identified [19]. These information
can be used by the network administrator to detect the
location of botmasters and remove them from the network.
The second important task of HD is to generate signatures
for detecting malware and spam, which are then used to
update the libraries of intrusion detection systems, blacklists
of spam filters, and user alerts or recommendations. The
process of reconfiguration of IDSs and spam filters can be
done either offline or real-time as in [20] and [21].
D. Botnet Propagation Model
Fig. 3 illustrates a mechanism used by botnets to infect
social network users, which has been found in the Koobface
botnet [2], [4]. The botnet maintains a fixed domain that
bots or zombies regularly contact to report uptime statistics
and request links for spamming activity. The bots aim to
obtain fresh user accounts and send malicious messages.
The bot messages contain a malicious URL obfuscated
by shortening services such as bit.ly or wrapped by an
innocuous website including Google Reader and Blogger.
Clicking on the URL of these messages eventually redirects
to a spoofed Youtube or Facebook page that attempts to trick
the victim into installing malware masquerading as a Flash
update. Unsuspecting users become infected by clicking on
these messages. Infected users are recruited to spam their
own social network friends, leading to a wide propagation
of malware within social network users.
Once a user has been compromised, it makes frequent
attempts to connect with one or more command control
(C&C) bots to retrieve commands from the botnet for further
actions. These commands are usually issued from another
compromised computer for the purpose of concealing the
botmaster’s real identity [16], leading to a hierarchical botnet
architecture. Fig. 4 illustrates the structure of a typical botnet,
where a single botmaster sends messages to two C&C bots
and then they send to bots.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL FOR HONEYBOT EXPLOITATION
In this section, we introduce a system model for hierar-
chical botnets and employ a Stackelberg game framework
to model the interactions between the botnet and infiltrating
honeybots.
A. Theoretical Framework
Consider a botmaster B that sends requests to a set of C&C
bots M = {1,2, · · · ,m} with m= |M |. Each C&C bot i∈M
sends commands to a set of compromised bot nodes Ni with
ni = |Ni|. We assume that the botnet is a three-level tree
architecture and, without loss of generality, we can assume
∩i∈M Ni = /0 since a single bot controlled by multiple C&C
bots can be modeled using multiple duplicate bots. Let H be
a honeybot that communicates with node i∈M , i.e., H ∈Ni.
We assume that all honeybots work together as a team, and
hence one honeybot node H under one C& C subtree can
conceptually represent a group of collaborative honeypots
who have succeeded in infiltrating the same botnet.
We let pi j ∈R+ be the number of messages or commands
(in bytes) per second sent from C&C bot i to bot node j ∈Ni.
Likewise, p ji denotes the number of response messages per
second to C&C node i ∈M from node j ∈Ni.
Each C&C node i maintains a trust value Ti j ∈ [0,1]
associated with a bot or honeybot node j ∈ Ni. The trust
values indicate the quality of response and performance
of bot nodes. The trust values also inherently model the
detection mechanisms in botnets, which have been discussed
in [16], [22]. For botnets with such mechanisms, low trust
values indicate the inefficiency of a bot or a high likelihood
of being a honeybot. For those without such mechanisms,
we can take Ti j = 1, for all j ∈Ni, i.e., equivalently seeing
all bots are all equally trusted.
One C&C bot needs to send commands to a large pop-
ulation of bot nodes. Hence, the goal of C&C bot i ∈ M
is to allocate its communication resources pi := [pi j, j ∈Ni]
to maximize the utility of its subtree network Ui : Rni+ → R,
which is the sum of utilities obtained from each bot j, i.e.,
Ui(pi) = ∑
j∈Ni
Ui j, (1)
where Ui j : R+ → R is the individual utility of C&C bot i
from bot j ∈Ni, which is chosen to be
Ui j(pi j) := Ti j p ji ln(αi pi j + 1). (2)
The choice of logarithmic function in (2) indicates that the
marginal utility of the C&C bot diminishes as the number of
messages increases. It captures the fact that the bots have
limited resources to respond to commands, and a larger
volume of commands can overwhelm the bots, which leads to
diminishing marginal utility of node i. αi ∈R++ is a positive
system parameter that determines marginal utility.
The utility of C&C bot i is also proportional to the number
of messages or responses per second from bot j, indicated
by p ji ∈ R+. The number of response messages from bot j
indicates the level of activity of a bot. We can see that when
p ji = 0 or Ti j = 0 in (2), then bot i is believed to be either
inactive or fake, and it is equivalently removed from the
subtree of C&C node j in terms of the total utility (1). Note
that Ti j in (2) evaluates the quality of the responses while p ji
evaluates the quantity. The product of Ti j and p ji captures
the fact that the botnet values highly active and trusted bots.
We consider the following C&C bot optimization problem
(BOP) of every node i ∈M :
(BOP) max
pi∈R
ni
+
Ui := ∑ j∈Ni Ti j p ji ln(αi pi j + 1)
s.t. ∑ j∈Ni ci j pi j ≤Ci. (3)
The constraint (3) in (BOP) is a capacity constraint on the
communications using C&C channel, where Ci is the total
capacity of the channel. The cost ci j ∈ R++ is the cost on
sending commands to bots. The cost is also dependent on
the size of messages from C&C bot i to its controlled bots.
It has been found in [4] that Twitter has larger volume of
spam messages than Facebook. This is due to the fact that
Twitter messages are often shorter than facebook messages,
and hence the cost for commanding bots spamming with
Twitter messages is relatively less than the one for Facebook.
Let Fi := {pi ∈ Rni+ : ∑ j∈Ni ci j pi j ≤ Ci} be the feasible
set of (BOP). We let Li : Rni+ ×R→ R be the associated
Lagrangian defined as follows:
Li(pi,λi) = ∑
j∈Ni
Ti j p ji ln(αi pi j + 1)+λi
(
∑
j∈Ni
ci j pi j −Ci
)
(4)
Since the feasible set is nonempty and convex, and the
objective function is convex in pi, it is clear that (BOP)
is a convex program, and hence we can use the first-order
optimality condition to characterize the optimal solution to
(BOP):
∂Li
∂ pi j
= ∑
j∈Ni
αiTi j p ji
αi pi j + 1
+λici j = 0, (5)
which leads to
pi j =−
Ti j
λici j
−
1
αi
. (6)
Due to the monotonicity of logarithmic functions in (2), the
optimal solution is found on the Pareto boundary of feasible
set. Hence by letting ∑ j∈Ni ci j pi j =Ci, we obtain Lagrangian
multiplier λi from (6) as follows.
λi =−
∑ j∈Ni Ti j p ji
Ci + 1αi ∑ j∈Ni ci j
. (7)
We make following assumptions before stating Theorem 1.
(A1) The product Ti j p ji 6= 0 for all j ∈Ni, i ∈M .
Assumption (A1) states that all bots controlled by C&C
bot i are both active and trusted. This assumption is valid
because for a controlled bot j that is either inactive (pi j = 0)
or untrusted (Ti j = 0) can be viewed as the one excluded
from the set Ni. Hence Assumption (A0) is equivalent to
the statement that Ni contains all active and trusted bots.
Theorem 1: Under Assumption (A1), (BOP) admits a
unique solution when αi is sufficiently large.
pi j =
(
Ti j p ji
∑ j∈Ni Ti j p ji
)(Ci + 1αi ∑ j∈Ni ci j
ci j
)
−
1
αi
. (8)
Proof: Assumption (A1) ensures that (BOP) is strictly
convex in pi j for all j ∈Ni. Hence the result follows directly
from (6) and (7). Since αi is a system parameter, we can
choose αi sufficiently large so that the solution obtained in
(8) is nonnegative.
B. Stackelberg Game
In this section, we formulate a two-stage Stackelberg
between honeybots and C&C nodes. Honeybots behave as
leaders who can learn the behaviors of the C&C bots once
they succeed in infiltrating the botnet and choose the optimal
strategies to respond to the commands from C&C bots.
The goal of honeypots is to collect as much information
as possible from the botmaster. We consider the following
game between honeypots and a C&C bot. The honeypot node
H firsts chooses a response rate pHi to the commands from
C&C bot i, and then C&C bot i observes the response and
chooses an optimal rate to send information to honeybot H
according to (BOP). We make the following assumption on
the real bots in the network.
(A2) The real bots are not strategically interacting with the
C&C bot i, i.e., they send messages to bot i at a constant
rate pi j, j 6= H, j ∈Ni.
The above assumption holds because bots are non-human
driven, pre-programmed to perform the same routine logic
and communications as coordinated by the same botmaster
[19]. Under Assumption (A2), the strategic interactions exist
only between honeybots and C&C nodes.
The honeypot node H has a certain cost when it responds
to the botnet. This can be either because of the potential
harm that it can cause on the system or due to the cost of
implementing commands from the botmaster. We consider
the following honeypot optimization problem (HOP), where
node H aims to maximize its utility function UH : R+×R→
R+ as follows:
(HOP) max
pHi∈FH
UH(piH , pHi) := ln(piH + ξH)−β Hi pHi,
where ξH ∈ R++ is a positive system parameter; β Hi is the
cost of honeybot H responding to the bot node i; pHi is the
message sending rate from honeybot node H to C&C bot i
and pHi is the rate of C&C bot i sending commands to H.
FH denotes the feasible set of the honeypot node H. We
let FH = {pHi,0 ≤ pHi ≤ pHi,max}, where pHi,max ∈ R++ is
a positive parameter that can be chosen to be sufficiently
large. The logarithmic part of the utility function (9) is
used to model the property of diminishing returns of an
information source. The value of receiving an additional
piece of information from the C&C bot decreases as the total
number of messages received by the honeypot increases.
The interactions between honeypot H and C&C node
i can be captured by the Stackelberg game model ΞS :=
〈(i,H),(Ui,UH),(Fi,FH)〉, and Stackelberg equilibrium can
be used as a solution concept to characterize the outcome of
the game.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium): Let
pi∗iH(·) : R
ni
+ → R+ be the unique best response of the
C&C bots to the response rate pHi of the honeypots.
An action profile (p∗i , p∗Hi) ∈ Fi ×FH is a Stackelberg
equilibrium if p∗i = piiH(p∗Hi), and the following inequality
holds UH(piiH(p∗Hi), p∗Hi)≥UH(piiH(pHi), pHi), ∀pHi ∈FH .
Theorem 2: Under Assumption (A1), the nonzero-sum
continuous-kernel Stackelberg game ΞS admits a Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Proof: The utility function of C&C bot i is strictly
convex for all pHi 6= 0 under Assumption (A1). Since FH
and FB are compact sets, by Corollary 4.4 of [23], the game
admits a Stackelberg equilibrium solution.
Under Assumption (A1), the unique best response piiH(·)
can be obtained from (8) for sufficiently large αi as follows:
piH = piiH(pHi) =CH
(
TiH pHi
TiH pHi + I−H
)
−
1
αi
, (9)
where I−H = ∑ j 6=H, j∈Ni Ti j p ji is the number of responses
from real bots weighted by their trust values and CH :=
Ci+ 1αi ∑ j∈Ni ci j
ciH
.
Letting ¯ξH = 1/αi+ξH and substituting (9) in (HOP), we
arrive at the following optimization problem faced by the
honeybot node H:
max
pHi∈FH
UH(piiH(pHi), pHi) :=
ln
(
CH
(
TiH pHi
TiH pHi + I−H
)
+ ¯ξH)−β Hi pHi. (10)
Theorem 3: Under Assumptions (A1) and (A2), the
Stackelberg equilibrium solution (p∗i , p∗Hi) of the game ΞS
is unique and can be found as follows:
p∗Hi =
CH I−H
2TiH(CH + ξH)


√
1+ 4 TiH(CH +
¯ξH)
I−HCHβ Hi
− 1


+
I−HξH
TiH(CH + ξH) , (11)
and p∗iH = piiH(p∗Hi) and p∗i j = pii j(pi j) for j 6= H, j ∈Ni.
Proof: The problem described in (13) is a convex
program with the utility function UH convex in pHi and
convex set F . Hence the first-order optimality condition
yields
CH I−HTiH =
β Hi (I−H + pHiTiH)(CH pHiTiH +(I−H + pHiTiH) ¯ξH), (12)
which is a quadratic equation to be solved for pHi and its
nonnegative solution of (12) is given in (11). Since pHi,max
is chosen sufficiently large and (11) is non-negative, p∗iH is
a feasible solution. The equilibrium solution for bot i hence
follows from (9).
In order to provide insights into the solution obtained in
(11), we make the following assumptions based on common
structures of the botnets.
(A3) The real bots controlled by C&C bot i have identical
features, i.e., ci j = c¯i, pi j = p¯i and Ti j = ¯Ti for all j 6=
H, j ∈Ni.
(A4) The size of the real bots controlled by C&C bot i is
much larger than the size of honeybots.
(A5) We let ¯ξH = 0.
Assumption (A5) is valid due to the freedom of choosing
parameter ξH in (HOP). Without loss of generality, we can
let ξH = 1α i and hence ¯ξH = 0. Assumption (A3) holds if
real bots controlled by C&C bot i are of the same type, for
example, Windows non-expert Facebook users. These type
of users are commonly the target of botnets. Under (A3), we
can simplify the expressions in (11) and obtain CH = Cici +
ni
αi
,
I−H = nBi ¯Ti p¯i.
Assumption (A4) is built upon the fact that one C&C
node in botnets often controls thousands of bots and the
size of honeybots are often comparably small due to their
implementation costs [24]. Under (A2), we have I−H ≫
pHiTiH , then (13) can be rewritten as
˜UH(piiH(pHi), pHi) = ln
(
CH
(
TiH pHi
I−H
)
+ ¯ξH
)
−β Hi pHi.
(13)
Corollary 1: Under Assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A4),
the Stackelberg equilibrium solution (p∗i , p∗Hi) of the game
ΞS is given by
p∗Hi =
(
1
β Hi
−
I−HξH
CHTiH +TiHξH
)+
, (14)
where (·)+ = max{0, ·}; p∗iH = piiH(p∗Hi) and p∗i j = pii j(pi j)
for j 6= H, j ∈Ni.
Proof: From (A4), we can rewrite (12) by replacing
I−H + pHiTiH with I−H . Since all the terms in (14) is bounded,
we can let pHi,max be sufficiently large and arrive at (14). The
result then follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 2: Let the size of real bots under C&C be nBi
and the size of the honeybots represented by super node H
nHi . Note that ni = nBi +nHi . Under Assumptions (A1) - (A5),
the Stackelberg equilibrium of the game ΞS is given by
p∗Hi =
1
β Hi
, p∗i j = pii j(pi j), (15)
for j 6=H, j ∈Ni, and the equilibrium solution of C&C node
i is composed of two terms given by p∗iH = p∗iH,S+ p∗iH,N , with
the first term independent of nHi ,
p∗iH,S =
TiH
TiH +β Hi nBi ¯Ti p¯i
(
Ci
ci
+
nBi
αi
)
−
1
αi
, (16)
and the second term dependent on nHi ,
p∗iH,S =
nHi TiH
TiH +β Hi nBi ¯Ti p¯i
. (17)
Proof: The result immediately follows from Corollary
1 using (A3) and (A5).
Remark 1: From Corollary 2, we can see that under As-
sumption (A1), the equilibrium response strategy is inversely
proportional to the unit cost β Hi . We can see that the number
of command and control messages harvested from the botnet
is affine in the number of successfully infiltrated honeybots.
The growth rate of the number of messages is given by
r∗iH :=
∂ p∗iH
∂nHi
=
TiH
β Hi nBi ¯Ti p¯i +TiH
. (18)
The growth rate is dependent of the trust value TiH . Honey-
bots can harvest more information from the botnet if they
Fig. 4. Illustration of a hierarchical social botnet
are more trusted. The growth rate is also dependent on the
number of the real bots controlled by C&C bot i. As nBi →∞,
the growth rate r∗iH → 0, i.e., size of honeybots will not affect
the number of messages received by the network.
Trust values can change over time and can either modeled
by a random process or by some assessment rules adopted by
the attacker. We can separate this into different subsections
of discussion. We can also consider a dynamic optimization
problem as well by having belief/trust as the state. This can
be done through using beta or Dirichlet distributions.
V. MODEL OF HONEYBOT DEPLOYMENT AND BOTNET
GROWTH
In what follows, a macroscopic model of the dynamics of
the number of bots at time t, denoted x1(t), and the number
of honeybots, denoted x2(t), is presented. We then formulate
an optimization problem for determining the number of
honeypot nodes to introduce into the network.
A. Botnet and honeypot growth models
The bots are assumed to send spam messages, containing
links to malware, with rate r. Each message is sent to each
of the d neighbors of the bot, where d is the average node
degree. Hence in each time interval dt, rd dt spam messages
are sent. Since the number of valid nodes is N − x1(t),
the number of messages reaching valid nodes is equal to
rd N−x1(t)N dt.
The number of nodes that become bots depends on the
behavior of the valid users and the number of links that
have been blacklisted. Each user clicks on a spam link with
probability q. If the link has been blacklisted, then the user
will be blocked from visiting the infected site; otherwise, the
user’s account is compromised and the device becomes part
of the botnet.
To determine the probability that a link has been black-
listed, we assume that each bot is independently given a set
of k malicious links, out of M links total. The probability
that a given link has been given to a specific honeybot is
therefore kM . Hence the probability that a link has not been
blacklisted is the probability that that link has not been given
to any honeybot, which is equal to
(
1− kM
)x2
. We assume
that:
(A6) The number of links given to each honeybot, k, satisfies
k ≪ M.
Under (A6), (1− kM )x2 can be approximated by (1− kx2M ).
Finally, we assume that the infected devices are discovered
and cleaned with rate µ1. This leads to dynamics
x˙1(t) = rdqx1
(
1− kx2
M
)
N− x1
N
− µ1x1. (19)
Honeybot nodes are inducted into the botnet in a similar
fashion. We make the following assumptions regarding the
honeybot population:
(A7) The number of honeybots that are not part of the botnet,
denoted z, is constant.
(A8) The number of honeybots is small compared to the total
number of users, so that zz+N ≈
z
N .
Assumption (A7) can be guaranteed by creating new, un-
infected honeybots when existing honeybots infiltrate the
botnet. As with real users, honeybot nodes cannot follow
links that have been blacklisted; however, unlike real users,
honeybot nodes will attempt to follow any link with proba-
bility 1. The botmaster detects and removes honeybots with
rate µ2. The honeybot population is therefore defined by
x˙2(t) = rdx1
(
1− kx2
M
)
z
N
− µ2x2. (20)
Proposition 1: The dynamics defined by (19) and (20)
have two equilibria, given by (x1,x2) = (0,0) and
x∗1 =
Nµ2M(rdq− µ1)
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
, x∗2 =
(
rd− µ1q
)
z
rdkz
M + µ2
. (21)
Proof: Equation (19) reaches equilibrium if x1 = 0 or
if rdq
(
1− kx2M
)
N−x1
N − µ1 = 0. If x1 = 0, then (20) reaches
equilibrium when x2 = 0.
If rdq
(
1− kx2M
)
N−x1
N − µ1 = 0, solving for x1 yields
x1 = N
(
1− µ1
rdq
(
1− kx2M
)
)
. Substituting into (20) gives the
equilibrium of (21).
The quantity rdq corresponds to the rate at which new
nodes are inducted into the botnet, while µ1 is the rate at
which nodes are cleaned and exit the botnet. Thus if rdq <
µ1, then the number of bots converges to zero, while rdq >
µ1 implies that the number of bots converges to a nonzero
steady-state value.
Since network security policies are typically updated in-
termittently, while the dynamics of (19) and (20) converge
rapidly, we base our subsequent analysis on the steady-
state values of x1 and x2, and derive the optimal number
of honeybots to introduce into the system in steady-state.
In order to prove that this problem is well-defined, we first
examine the stability properties of each equilibrium in the
following theorem.
Theorem 4: If µ1 > rdq, then (x1,x2) = (0,0) is asymp-
totically stable. If µ1 < rdq, then (x∗1,x∗2) is asymptotically
stable in the limit as M → ∞, N → ∞.
Proof: An equilibrium point of a nonlinear dynam-
ical system is asymptotically stable if its linearization is
asymptotically stable at that point [25, Theorem 3.7]. The
linearization of (19) and (20) around (0,0) is given by
A00 =
(
rdq− µ1 0
rdz
N −µ2
)
.
If µ1 > rdq, then −A00 is diagonally dominant, and hence
has eigenvalues with positive real part [ref]. The eigenval-
ues of A00 therefore have negative real part, implying that
the linearization around (0,0) is asymptotically stable. The
linearization Ax∗1x∗2 around (x
∗
1,x
∗
2) is given by
Ax∗1x∗2 =
(
a11 a12
a21 a22
)
, where
a11 = µ1−
rdq
N
(
µ2M+ µ1kzq
µ2M+ rdkz
)
·
(
−N +
2µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)
,
a12 =−
rdqkN
M
(
1−
µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)
·
(
µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)
,
a21 =
rdz
N
(
µ2M+ µ1kz/q
µ2M+ rdkz
)
,
a22 =−
rdkz
M
(
1− µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)
− µ2.
To prove that Ax∗1x∗2 has eigenvalues with negative real part,
we examine −Ax∗1x∗2 . The second row is clearly diagonally
dominant, since the diagonal element is positive and the
off-diagonal element is negative. The first row is diagonally
dominant if
−
rdqkN
M
(
1−
µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)(
µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)
< µ1 + rdq
(
µ2M+ µ1kzq
µ2M+ rdkz
−
2µ1rdkz+ µ2M
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
)
. (22)
In the limit as M → ∞, the left-hand side of (22) con-
verges to zero while the right-hand side reduces to µ1 +
rdq
(
1− 1
rdqN
)
, which is positive for N sufficiently large.
Hence −Ax∗1x∗2 is diagonally dominant, and therefore has
eigenvalues with positive real part, implying that (x∗1,x∗2) is
a stable equilibrium point.
B. Computation of system parameters
The parameter µ2 determines the rate at which honeypot
nodes are discovered and removed by the botmaster, and
hence can be calculated by observing the lifetime of deployed
honeypots (see Section VI). Similarly, the number of received
messages p and the cost τ can be estimated by averaging
over the set of deployed honeypots over time. The fraction of
malicious links kM that are given to a single bot or honeypot
is estimated by using the assumption that links are distributed
independently and uniformly at random by the botmaster, so
that the probability that a given link has been received by
a honeypot is
(
1− kM
)x2
. This probability can be estimated
by analyzing the set of malicious links received by new
honeypots, which combined with knowledge of x2 enables
computation of kM . The rate at which spam messages are sent
by bots, denoted r, is estimated by the number of instruction
messages received by the honeypots.
The parameters µ1 and q, equal to the rate at which bots
are removed from the botnet, and the fraction of malicious
links that are followed by users, depend on user behavior.
These parameters can be estimated using existing data sets
of user behavior [26]. Furthermore, to obtain an upper bound
on the effectiveness of the botnet, the parameter q can be
set equal to 1, implying that a valid user always clicks any
link to the malware executable (the worst case). The average
node degree, d, is estimated based on existing analyses of
the degree distribution of social networks [27].
C. Extension to heterogeneous networks
Typical social networks follow a non-uniform degree
distribution. We present a model for the bot and honeypot
population dynamics as follows. Let Nd denote the total
number of users with degree d, and let xd1(t) and xd2(t) denote
the number of bots and honeypots with degree d at time t.
The average degree of the network is equal to d. We make
the assumption that:
(A9) The average degree of the infected users is equal to the
average degree of the social network as a whole.
The total number of spam messages sent by bots in time
interval dt is equal to rdx1 dt, each of which has not been
blacklisted with probability
(
1− kx2M
)
. The probability that
the recipient of a message has degree d and has not been
infected is equal to
Pr(degree d, not infected) = Nd − x
d
1
Nd
dNd
dN
=
(Nd − xd1)d
dN
.
This implies that the dynamics of xd1(t) are given by
x˙d1(t) =
rdq
N
x1
(
1− kx2
M
)
(Nd − xd1)− µ1xd1 , (23)
where Nd is the number of user accounts of degree d.
Similarly, the probability that the recipient of a spam
message is a honeypot node of degree d that has not been
infected yet is z
∗
d
N , where zd is the number of honeybots of
degree d that have not joined the botnet, leading to dynamics
of xd2(t) described by
x˙d2(t) =
rd
N
x1
(
1− kx2
M
)
z∗d − µ2xd2 . (24)
Proposition 2: The dynamics (23) and (24) have equilib-
rium points at xd1 = xd2 = 0 for all d and
xd∗1 =

rdq

1− krdz
(
1− µ1
rdq
)
z
rkzdz + µ2M
−
µ1
rdq

+ µ1


−1
(25)
·

rdq

1− krdz
(
1− µ1
rdq
)
z
rkzdz + µ2M
−
µ1
rdq



 ,
xd∗2 =
rd
µ2

1− krdZ
(
1− µ1
rdq
)
z
rkzdZ + µ2M
−
µ1
rdq

zd . (26)
Proof: Summing (23) over d yields
x˙1(t) =
x1drq
N
(
1− kx2
M
)
(N− x1)− µ1x1,
which implies that in steady-state we have
x∗1 = N

1− µ1
rdq
(
1− kx2M
)

 . (27)
Similarly, summing x˙d2(t) over d results in
x˙2(t) =
rx1
N
(
1− kx2
M
)
zdZ − µ2x2,
which combined with (27) gives x∗2 =
rdz
(
1− µ1
rdq
)
rkzdz
M +µ2
. The steady-
state value (26) can be obtained from (24). Similarly, xd∗1 can
be obtained from (23).
VI. MODELING OF PROTECTION AND ALERT SYSTEM
(PAS)
PAS is a coordination system that strategically deploys
honeybots and designs security policies for social networks.
In this section, we focus on optimal reconfiguration of hon-
eybots as illustrated in Fig. 2. We introduce a mathematical
framework for finding honeybot deployment strategies based
on system models described in Sections IV and V.
A. Relations between HD and HE
We have adopted a divide-and-conquer approach in Sec-
tions IV and V, and have modeled the behavior of each
system independently. However, the interdependencies be-
tween HD and HE are essential for PAS to make optimal
security policies for the social network. The HE model in
Section IV describes strategic operations of honeybots at a
microscopic level while the HD model in Section V provides
a macroscopic description of the population dynamics of bots
and honeybots. These two models are interrelated through
their parameters together with the feedback control from
PAS.
The interactions between bots and honeybots in the HE
model occur on a time scale of seconds. The analysis of
Stackelberg equilibrium in Section IV captures the steady-
state equilibrium after a repeated or learning process of the
game. Hence the equilibrium can be reached on a time scale
of minutes. On the other hand, the population dynamics
in HD model evolve on a larger time scale (for example,
days). Hence, we can assume that the Stackelberg game has
reached its equilibrium when the populations evolve at a
macroscopic level. Decisions made at PAS are on a longer
time scale (for example, weeks) because the processing of
collected information, learning of bots and honeybots in
social networks, and high-level decision on security policy
in reality demand considerable amount of human resources
for coordination and supervision.
1) Trust Values and Detection Rate: The trust values Ti j
used in HE model are related to the macroscopic detection
and removal rate µ2 in HD model. As we have pointed out
earlier, zero trust values are equivalent to the removal of
honeybots from the botnet. Hence we can adopt a simple
dynamic model to describe the change of Ti j over a longer
time period (say, days). We let T 0i j be the initial condition
of the trust value. The evolution of Ti j over the macroscopic
time scale can be modeled using the following ODE:
Ti j(t) =−µ2Ti j(t), Ti j(t0i j) = T 0i j . (28)
Note that honeybots have different initial time t0i j. Hence
from (28), we obtain
Ti j(t) = e−µ2(t−t
0
i j), t ≥ t0i j, (29)
i.e., the trust values exponentially decay with respect to the
removal rate. a threshold can be set on. From (29), we can
obtain the mean life time of a honeybot is 1/µ2. Macroscopic
parameter µ2 can be estimated by the rate of change of
working honeybots in the botnet, which can is known to
the system, while Ti j is a microscopic parameter and is often
unknown directly to honeybots. With the ODE model in (28),
we can use µ2 to estimate Ti j.
2) Honeybot and Bot Populations: In Section V, the
populations of bots and infiltrating honeybots are denoted
by x1 and x2, respectively, whereas in Section IV, the bot
size under C&C bot is nBi . Under a hierarchical structure
of botnet, illustrated in Fig. 4, the total bot and honeybot
populations x1,x2 are given by
x1 =
m
∑
i=1
nBi , x2 =
m
∑
i=1
nHi . (30)
If all C&C bots are assumed to be identical, i.e., nBi = n¯B, i ∈
M ,nHi = n¯
H , i ∈M , then xi = mn¯B, and xi = mn¯H
3) Activity Level of Bots: The rate p¯i in (18) indicates
the activity level of bots when they respond to or poll
information from C&C node i. This level of activity is
often correlated with parameter r, the rate of sending out
spamming messages to the social network. Assume that all
C&C bots are assumed to be identical, i.e., p¯i = p¯, i ∈ M ,
then we can let p¯ = αr, where p¯ is in messages/sec, r is in
messages/sec and α ∈ R++ is a unitless positive parameter.
B. Cross-Layer Optimal Honeybot Deployment
In what follows, we first derive the optimal honeybot
deployment when the benefit from each honeypot is mea-
surable. We then combine the analysis of Sections IV and
V to determine the optimal honeybot deployment, taking
into account the behavior of the deployed nodes during the
exploitation phase.
The goal of the honeypot operator is to maximize the
number of blacklisted links that are reported to the social
network. Based on the analysis of Corollary 2, we assume
that the number of blacklisted links is proportional to the
number of honeypot nodes in the botnet in steady-state, x∗2.
The variable is the number of honeypot nodes that have not
yet been inducted into the botnet, z. This leads to a utility
function given by VH(z) = px∗2(z)− τ(x∗2 + z), where p and
τ represent the benefit (information gathered) and cost of
maintaining a single honeypot node. Substituting (21) yields
VH(z) = p
(
rd− µ1q
)
z
rdkz
M + µ2
− τ


(
rd− µ1q
)
z
rdkz
M + µ2
+ z


=
(p− τ)
(
rd− µ1q
)
z
rdkz
M + µ2
− τz. (31)
The value of z that maximizes (31) is given by the following
proposition.
Proposition 3: The optimum value of z is given by
z∗ = M

−µ2 +
√
(p− τ)(rd− µ1q )µ2/τ
rdk

 . (32)
Proof: Differentiating VH(z) with respect to z yields
∂VH
∂ z =
(p− τ)
(
rd− µ1q
)
µ2(
rdk
M z+ µ2
)2 − τ.
By inspection, ∂VH∂ z is a strictly decreasing function of z, so
that VH(z) is strictly concave. Setting this expression equal
to zero implies (32).
Remark 2: Eq. (32) has several implications for the de-
sign of honeybot systems. First, for malware that propagates
rapidly (corresponding to a large rd value), fewer honeybots
are needed, since the malware will quickly spread to the
deployed honeybot. Second, if µ2 is large, then honeybots are
rapidly detected and removed by the botmaster, and hence
the cost of deploying honeybots outweighs the benefits.
The utility function (31) can be augmented by incorporat-
ing the impact on the exploitation phase. In particular, (18)
implies that p = 1
1+
βHi x∗1T ir
TiH
, which we write as p = 11+ζx∗1 ≈
1
ζx∗1 when the number of bots is sufficiently large. The utility
function VH can then be written as
VH =
(
1
ζx∗1 − τ
)
x∗2− τz (33)
An efficient algorithm for maximizing (33) can be derived
using the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The problem of selecting z to maximize VH
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Fig. 5. Simulation of our framework for a network of N = 106 users, where each user has probability q = 0.01 of following a malicious link, message are
sent at a rate of 0.4 messages per bot per day, and infected nodes are cleaned after 5 days on average. (a) Effect of increasing the number of honeypot nodes
on the botnet population. Deployment of a small number of honeypots can greatly reduce the number of bots present. Note that the population converges
quickly to its equilibrium value. (b) The optimum number of bots based on (32) for different costs τ and benefits p. The total number of honeypots remains
small for each case. (c) Effect of degree distribution on the botnet population for number of honeypots z = 5. Each network is scale-free, with exponent γ
varying between networks. A higher connectivity results in a larger number of bots.
in (33) is equivalent to
max
θ ,φ ,x∗2,z
1
ζ

− rdqθ 2
Nrdqφ − µ1 +
M/4k
N(rdq
(
1− kx
∗
2
M
)
− µ1)


−τx∗2− τz, (34)
s.t. θ = x∗2−
M
2k ,
φ = 1− kx
∗
2
M
, (35)
x∗2 ≤
(
rd− µ1q
)
z
rdkz
M + µ2
, (36)
1
ζ
rdqµ2M+ rdkzµ1
(rdq− µ1)µ2M
≥ τ,
z ≥ 0, 0≤ x∗2 ≤ N,
which is a convex program.
Proof: The optimization problem of selecting z to
maximize VH can be written as
maximize
(
1
ζx∗1(z) − τ
)
x∗2(z)− τz
z ∈ R+
(37)
If 1ζx∗1(z) − τ < 0, then the objective function is monotonedecreasing in z, leading to an optimal value z = 0. To avoid
this, we require 1ζx∗1(z) ≥ τ , leading to constraint (37). Using(21), we have
x∗2
ζx∗1
=
(
x∗2−
kx∗22
M
)
rdq
N
(
rdq
(
1− kx
∗
2
M
)
− µ1
) = rdq
(
− kM
(
x∗2−
M
2k
)2
+ M4k
)
N
(
rdq
(
1− kx
∗
2
M
)
− µ1
) .
(38)
Substituting θ =
(
x∗2−
M
2k
)
and φ =
(
1− kx
∗
2
M
)
leads to the
objective function
VH(x∗2,z,θ ,φ) =
1
ζ

− rdqθ 2
Nrdqφ − µ1 +
M/4k
N(rdq
(
1− kx
∗
2
M
)
− µ1)


−τx∗2− τz (39)
Since quadratic over linear and inverse functions are convex,
the first two terms of (39) are concave, and hence VH is
concave.
Finally, the fact that the objective function is increasing
as a function of x∗2 and decreasing as a function of z implies
that the constraint (36) holds with equality at the optimum,
so that the relationship between x∗2 and z in (21) is satisfied.
This constraint is convex due to Proposition 3.
The convex optimization approach presented in Theorem
5 is used to select a honeybot deployment strategy in order
to maximize the level of infiltration into the botnet and
the amount of data gathered during the exploitation phase.
Once inducted into the botnet, the honeybots follow the
Stackelberg equilibrium strategy of Section IV and use the
collected data to generate malware signatures and create
URL blacklists. The parameters of (33) are updated in
response to changes in botnet behavior observed during the
exploitation phase.
VII. SIMULATION STUDY
We evaluated our proposed method using Matlab sim-
ulation study, described as follows. A network consisting
of N = 106 nodes was generated, with degree d = 100
(consistent with observations of the average degree of social
networks [27]). The rate at which malware messages are
sent is given by r = 0.4 messages per bot day, and the
rate at which nodes are disinfected and removed from the
botnet is µ1 = 0.2, an average lifetime for each bot of 5
days. These statistics are based on the empirical observations
of [4]. Based on [5], we estimate that the probability of a user
clicking on a spam link is given by q = 0.01. It is assumed
that the fraction of malware links given to each bot is equal
to k/M = 0.01. The rate at which honeybots are detected and
removed is equal to µ2 = 0.5. In each case, we assume that
there are 50 infected nodes and 0 honeybots present in the
network initially.
The population dynamics of the bots, described by (19)
and (20), are shown in Fig. 5(a). Each curve represents the
number of infected users over time for a different level of
honeybot activity, as described by the parameter z. In each
case, the number of bots converges to its equilibrium value.
The top curve (solid line) assumes z = 0, i.e. no decep-
tion takes place and malicious links are detected through
blacklists only. Employing deception through honeybots
significantly reduces the botnet population, even when the
number of honeybots is small relative to the population size.
As additional honeybots are added, the botnet population
continues to decline. However, the marginal benefit of adding
a honeybot decreases as the number of honeybots grows
large.
The optimum number of honeybots depends on the cost of
introducing and maintaining honeybots, denoted τ , as well
as the benefit p from each honeybot, as described in (32).
The optimum number of honeybots is given in Fig. 5(b).
As the cost of introducing new honeybots is reduced, the
optimal number of honeybots increases. In each case, the
optimum number of honeybots remains small, at around 25
nodes, relative to the total network population of 106 nodes.
The effect of a heterogeneous degree distribution is shown
in Fig. 5(c). The degree distribution was chosen to be scale-
free, so that the probability that a node has degree d was
proportional to d−γ . Hence a higher value of γ corresponds to
a less-connected network. The parameter γ had a significant
impact on the rate of propagation of the botnet, even through
for the chosen values of γ the average degrees of the three
networks were similar.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the problem of defending against
social botnet attacks through deception. We considered a
defense mechanism in which fake honeybot accounts are
deployed and infiltrate the botnet, impersonating infected
users. The infiltrating honeybots gather information from
command and control messages, which are used to form
malware signatures or add spam links to URL blacklists.
We introduced a framework for SOcial network Deception
and EXploitation through hOneybots (SODEXO), which
provides an analytical approach to modeling and designing
social honeybot defenses. We decomposed SODEXO into
deployment and exploitation components.
In the deployment component, we model the population
dynamics of the infected users and honeybots, and show
how the infected population is affected by the number of
honeybots introduced. We derive the steady-state populations
of infected users and honeybots and prove the stability of
the equilibrium point. In the exploitation component, we
formulate a Stackelberg game between the botmaster and the
honeybots and determine the amount of information gathered
by the honeybot in equilibrium. The two components are
combined in the Protection and Alert System (PAS), which
chooses an optimal deployment strategy based on the ob-
served behavior of the botnet and the information gathered
by the honeybots. Our results are supported by simulation
studies, which show that a small number of honeybots
significantly decrease the infected population of a large social
network.
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